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INTRODUCTION
Christina Voight was pregnant with her son Lance while being prosecuted
for arson.1 Though she bitterly contested the charges, she was convicted and
sentenced to prison for four to eight years.2 Christina gave birth to Lance shortly after beginning to serve her sentence.3 Authorities immediately took him
away from her and sent him to a foster home.4 Shortly thereafter, the state filed
a petition to terminate Christina’s parental rights.5
It was no easy task to fight the state from prison. After some legal maneuvering, however, the state withdrew their petition and moved Lance into a
home dedicated to helping incarcerated women maintain a relationship with
their children.6 During the remaining three years of Christina’s sentence, Lance
visited her frequently.7 She left prison and began working for the Open Society
Institute, an organization dedicated to criminal justice reform.8 She has since

1

David Crary, Prison Moms Fight Termination of Parental Rights, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2003, at A16.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
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become a prominent advocate for social justice, focusing on incarcerated women and reproductive rights.9
Christina was fortunate in that she had an attorney.10 Many of her fellow
inmates were not so fortunate.11 Recognizing the plight of other incarcerated
women, Christina ran workshops in the prison to educate them on the legal process and the importance of staying in contact with their children.12 For many of
these women, Christina’s help was the closest they came to receiving legal advice.13
The U.S. Constitution does not recognize a right to counsel in termination
of parental rights (TPR) proceedings. While the Constitution explicitly safeguards the right to counsel in criminal proceedings,14 as well as protection of
individual due process rights,15 it makes no mention of a right to counsel in
TPR proceedings or any other form of civil proceeding.16 In the landmark Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County decision, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that this omission indicated “the Constitution [does
not require] the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding.”17 The Supreme Court of Nevada emphatically agreed, when it declared,
“[N]o absolute right to counsel in termination proceedings exists in Nevada.”18
These holdings inevitably lead to defendants being denied counsel in proceedings seeking to terminate their parental rights—some of the most fundamental
rights that exist. Only four other states deny indigent defendants the right to an
attorney when the awesome power of the government moves to eliminate their

9

Michelle Chen, Parents in Prison, Children in Foster Care, GOTHAM GAZETTE (July 20,
2009), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/state/266-parents-in-prison-children-in-fos
ter-care.
10
Crary, supra note 1.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Though many TPR cases feature defendants that are not nearly as sympathetic as Christina Voight, all defendants should enjoy the same rights, regardless of the facts of their particular case. In fact, it is the more unsympathetic defendants that may be in more need of representation, as proving their case is likely to be more difficult.
14
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
15
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
16
See generally U.S. CONST. (containing no explicit language regarding a right to counsel in
civil proceedings).
17
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981).
18
In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223, 225 (Nev. 2005).
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parental rights.19 Nevada must join the forty-five other states20 and declare an
absolute right to counsel in TPR proceedings, both at trial and on appeal.
Since the Lassiter decision, legal scholars across the country have argued
for the adoption of “Civil Gideon.”21 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings is a
fundamental right, and it therefore applies to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 The support for a broader right to
counsel can be traced back as far as the Magna Carta.23 The modern movement,
though, has certainly gained momentum in the aftermath of the Gideon and
Lassiter decisions.24
The term “Civil Gideon” is misleading, however, as it implies a push towards an absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings similar to the fundamental Sixth Amendment right to counsel as recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright.25
Most scholars generally do not advocate the creation of such a broad right.26
Instead, the proponents of Civil Gideon argue for the right to counsel in civil
proceedings only where fundamental interests or basic human needs are at
stake.27
The right to be the parent to one’s child is so fundamental that defendants
threatened with the termination of that right should have a categorical right to
counsel in such proceedings. While many of these arguments could apply to
every state and to the federal government, this Note will focus specifically on
the status of Nevada law and the corresponding need for change.
Part I begins with a general discussion of the rights of the indigent defendant in TPR proceedings, including the distinctions between criminal and civil
rights to counsel, a history of the relevant federal cases, and an examination of
the approaches of the fifty states and of foreign nations. Part II introduces the
history of the legislative and judicial law regarding Civil Gideon in Nevada.
Part III identifies the failures of the case-by-case approach created in Lassiter.
This section will include a general analysis of the implications of Lassiter and a
19

See John Pollock, The Case Against Case-by-Case: Courts Identifying Categorical Rights
to Counsel in Basic Human Needs Civil Cases, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 781 (2013) (noting
that forty-four states provided a categorical right to counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M.,
319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the forty-fifth state to provide this right).
20
See Pollock, supra note 19; see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d at 355.
21
See, e.g., Sarah Dina Moore Alba, Note, Searching for the “Civil Gideon”: Procedural
Due Process and the Juvenile Right to Counsel in Termination Proceedings, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1079, 1081 (2011) (discussing the “robust support for a Civil Gideon”).
22
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963).
23
See Ward B. Coe III & Debra Gardner, A Right to Counsel in Critical Civil Cases and the
Role of the Private Bar, 47 MD. B.J., July–Aug. 2014, at 12, 14.
24
See id.
25
John Pollock & Michael S. Greco, It’s Not Triage If the Patient Bleeds Out, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 40, 40 n.1 (2012).
26
Coe & Gardner, supra note 23, at 15.
27
Id.
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specific examination of the ramifications of Nevada’s current approach. Finally, part IV proposes creating a categorical right to counsel in TPR proceedings.
I.

THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT IN TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES, GENERALLY

The Supreme Court has recognized a right to counsel on a case-by-case basis in civil cases, including in TPR proceedings.28 The overwhelming majority
of the states have since recognized the importance of counsel in these proceedings and have created their own right through either legislative or judicial action.29 To understand this disparity between state and federal law, it is important to recognize the different constitutional rights afforded to the criminal
and civil defendants.
A. The Divergent Rights of the Indigent Defendant
in Criminal and Civil Proceedings
There can be no doubt that our justice system treats the indigent civil defendant differently than the indigent criminal defendant. Criminal defendants
are guaranteed the right to counsel;30 civil defendants are not.31 The U.S. Constitution is the source of this disparity.
1. The Sixth Amendment: Indigent Defendants in Criminal Proceedings
While the Constitution provides no explicit right to counsel in civil proceedings,32 the Bill of Rights clearly enumerates a right to counsel in criminal
proceedings. The Sixth Amendment’s final clause states,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.33

In Gideon, the Supreme Court held the right to counsel in criminal proceedings is a fundamental right and incorporated it to the states through the

28

See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the
forty-fifth state to provide this right).
30
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
31
See generally U.S. CONST. (containing no explicit language regarding a right to counsel in
civil proceedings).
32
Id.
33
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
29
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.34 In support of this holding, the
Court made several observations: (1) governments allocate significant funds
toward the prosecution of criminal defendants;35 (2) that the government and
the affluent do not hesitate to enlist the aid of an attorney shows the necessity
of counsel;36 (3) even the most intelligent layman is likely to have no skill in
the law;37 and (4) an unrepresented innocent person may still be found guilty if
he does not know how to prove that he is innocent.38
2. No Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil Proceedings
Conversely, the Court has recognized no such corresponding right in civil
proceedings.39 Although most civil cases deal with issues that do not threaten a
party’s fundamental interests, some claims do rise to this level. For example,
courts jail thousands of defendants daily in civil contempt for failing to pay
child support.40 In fact, although Nevada has a criminal statute for nonpayment
of child support,41 family court judges may still hold a nonpaying defendant in
civil contempt.42 Both proceedings carry the possible penalty of incarceration.43
Despite the possible loss of liberty in the latter situation, the defendant has no
right to an attorney.44 This reality does not comport with the principles the Supreme Court addressed in Gideon.45
Similarly, defendants in TPR proceedings face the loss of an interest possibly even more compelling than their own physical liberty—the right to be a
parent to their own children. The Supreme Court noted:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children “come[s] to this Court with
a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements.”46

34

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel in
criminal proceedings is a “fundamental right”).
35
Id. at 344.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 345 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
38
Id. (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 69).
39
See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981).
40
Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 95 (2008).
41
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.020 (2013).
42
See Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 102 P.3d 41, 43 (Nev.
2004).
43
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.020; Rodriguez, 102 P.3d at 43.
44
See Rodriguez, 102 P.3d at 43.
45
See supra text accompanying notes 34–38.
46
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (alteration in original) (quoting Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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Because the Constitution is silent on the right to counsel in civil proceedings, such a right can only be derived from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”47 This constitutional
command applies only to the federal government.48 The Fourteenth Amendment extends its application to state governments, providing that “nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”49 It is from these due process guarantees that a right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings originates.50
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding Right to Counsel in Civil
Proceedings
The U.S. Supreme Court has delivered two key opinions relevant to the
civil right to counsel. Mathews created the due process test and Lassiter applied
that test to conclude that civil defendants are not constitutionally entitled to an
attorney.51
1. The Mathews v. Eldridge Test
Any due process analysis must begin by applying the test the Supreme
Court created in Mathews v. Eldridge.52 There, the Court considered a challenge to administrative procedures that resulted in the termination of the plaintiff’s Social Security disability payments.53 The Court found that the existing
administrative procedures adequately protected the plaintiff’s due process interests.54 In doing so, the Court created a three-pronged balancing test for due
process claims, by which a court must consider
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedures would entail.55

47

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (holding “the fifth amendment must
be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the
states”).
49
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
50
See infra Part IV.
51
See infra Part I.B.
52
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
53
Id. at 319–20.
54
Id. at 339–40.
55
Id. at 321.
48
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Unlike the absolute right to counsel provided to criminal defendants under
the Sixth Amendment, this due process analysis must occur on a case-by-case
basis. However, even the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for criminal defendants was determined on a case-by-case basis until the Court expressly overruled such analysis in Gideon.56
2. The Lassiter Setback
The Court first applied the Eldridge factors to involuntary termination of
parental rights proceedings in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of
Durham County.57 There, after the petitioner, Abby Lassiter, was imprisoned
pursuant to a second-degree murder conviction, the local Department of Social
Services petitioned to terminate her parental rights.58 The trial court declined to
delay the hearing so that Ms. Lassiter could seek counsel, and it neglected to
consider her indigence.59 The court terminated Ms. Lassiter’s parent rights, citing her failure to contact her infant son for more than two years or to plan for
his future.60 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.61
In a major setback to proponents of the Civil Gideon movement, the Court
held that the Due Process Clause does not mandate the appointment of counsel
in TPR proceedings.62 Instead, the Court declared that the trial court is to make
such a determination on a case-by-case basis by applying the Eldridge factors.63
The Court noted:
Here, as in Scarpelli, “[i]t is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining
when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process
requirements,” since here, as in that case, “[t]he facts and circumstances . . . are
susceptible of almost infinite variation.”64

The Court then applied the Mathews v. Eldridge factors to Ms. Lassiter’s
circumstances and noted that (1) no allegations implicated criminal acts; (2) the
hearing required no expert witnesses; (3) the area of law was not troublesome;
and (4) most importantly, the presence of counsel would not have made a difference.65 Though the private interest at stake was high, the Court determined
that the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest was low,66 and therefore,
the failure of the trial court to appoint counsel for Ms. Lassiter did not deprive
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27–32 (1981).
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 32.
See id.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
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her of her due process rights.67 The implications of Lassiter are troubling. Lassiter “stands for the proposition that a drunken driver’s night in the cooler is a
greater deprivation of liberty than a parent’s permanent loss of rights in a
child.”68
C. An Overview of the States’ Approaches to Right to Counsel in TPR
Proceedings
The number of states providing an attorney, by law, in TPR proceedings
has steadily increased—even in the wake of the Lassiter decision.69 This suggests the states recognize the fundamental rights at risk in these proceedings.
Whatever the reason, the progress in the states is encouraging.
1. States’ Approaches Before Lassiter
At the time of the Lassiter decision, thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia had either a statute or binding precedent that provided for a categorical right to counsel in termination proceedings.70 The Lassiter Court, in an apparent acknowledgment of the dangers of its holding, noted this fact, stating
that its “opinion today [denying a Constitutional right to counsel in TPR cases]
in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public
opinion and now widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and
wise.”71
2. States’ Approaches After Lassiter
Any fears that the Lassiter decision would convince these thirty-three
states to roll back their added protections were soon dispelled. Mississippi was
the only state that retreated to a case-by-case approach after Lassiter.72 By
1997, forty-four states offered a categorical right to counsel in TPR cases.73
The other six states—Delaware, Hawaii, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wyoming,
and Mississippi—all employed a case-by-case determination using the Eldridge
factors.74

67

Id.
Douglas J. Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent’s Right to Counsel After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 221 (1981).
69
See infra Part I.C.1–2.
70
Pollock, supra note 19.
71
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34.
72
See Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings: The States’ Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REV. 247, 262 (1997). However,
this is misleading. Mississippi is counted among the thirty-three states with categorical approaches in the Lassiter decision only because petitioner’s brief claimed it to be true. Id.
Mississippi repealed that statute, though, two years prior to the Lassiter decision. Id.
73
See id. at 276–77.
74
See id.
68

16 NEV. L.J. 313, FOLEY - FINAL.DOCX

322

1/15/16 9:28 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:313

Currently, state law shows little change since 1997.75 In 2008, South Carolina yielded to the Civil Gideon movement when it passed legislation declaring,
“[p]arents, guardians, or other persons subject to a termination of parental
rights action are entitled to legal counsel. Those persons unable to afford legal
representation must be appointed counsel by the family court . . . .”76 In 2010,
Tennessee followed suit when it enacted a statute that entitles parents to “representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceeding . . . involving . . .
[t]ermination of parental rights.”77 Finally, in 2014, the Supreme Court of Hawaii declared that the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution “guaranteed the right to court-appointed counsel in termination proceedings.”78 Currently, forty-five states and the District of Columbia provide indigent
defendants with a categorical right to counsel in termination of parental rights
proceedings.79
Unfortunately, two states that once provided a categorical right to counsel
in TPR cases have since restricted the right.80 Minnesota converted to the caseby-case approach when it modified its statute to require the appointment of
counsel only when the court “feels that such an appointment is appropriate.”81
Nevada is the only other state to retreat from its previously afforded protections.82 Delaware, Mississippi, and Wyoming have all maintained their case-bycase approach.83
Nevertheless, the right to counsel has continued to expand nationwide. Importantly, states that already provide the right have expanded its application.84
These gains have occurred both legislatively and judicially,85 and states have
expanded both the legal issues86 and the procedural stages87 to which the right
applies. This trend demonstrates that states continue to favor expanding the

75

See Young, supra note 72, at 276–77; see also Pollock, supra note 19, at 781 n.76.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2560(A) (2010) (emphasis added).
77
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-126(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2013).
78
In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014).
79
See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d at 355 (making Hawaii the forty-fifth state to
provide this right).
80
See Young, supra note 72, at 276–77; see also Pollock, supra note 19, at 781 n.76.
81
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.163(3)(b) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
82
See Young, supra note 72, at 276–77; see also Pollock, supra note 19, at 781 n.76; infra
Part II.
83
See Pollock, supra note 19, at 781 n.76.
84
See Alba, supra note 21, at 1091.
85
Id.
86
Id. (showing the establishment of the right to counsel for “cases involving child custody,
involuntary commitment and guardianship, orders of protection, and civil contempt”).
87
See Patricia C. Kussmann, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in
Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 92 A.L.R.5th Art. 379 (2001)
(showing the establishment of the right to counsel in pretermination investigations, in review
proceedings following dependency hearings, and in appellate proceedings).
76
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right to counsel in civil proceedings—particularly those that involve “critical
issues affecting basic human needs.”88
Those states that still use the case-by-case approach deny indigent defendants counsel for a wide variety of reasons.89 For example, some states deny a
request for counsel if it is not timely made.90 Others may deny counsel when
the defendant fails to appear.91 One court in Tennessee denied counsel to two
indigent parents, because they “were active participants in the termination proceeding.”92 In doing so, the court distinguished the parents’ education from
other, more “poorly educated” defendants.93 This was a peculiar approach, considering that the mother had only a GED and the father had only completed the
eighth grade.94
D. The Right Internationally
In a nation that calls itself “the land of the free”95 and that regularly castigates the human rights records of other countries,96 the United States is far from
the model nation when it comes to the civil right to counsel. English common
law granted the right to counsel for indigent defendants in civil cases as far
back as the thirteenth century.97 Parliament codified the right in 1495.98
Additionally, most other European countries have laws providing a civil
right to counsel.99 France recognized the right in 1852, Italy in 1865, and Germany in 1877, with the rest passing “Civil Gideon” laws in the late 1800s and

88

Alba, supra note 21, at 1091 (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651 (West 2011)).
See Kussmann, supra note 87.
90
See, e.g., K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 771 So. 2d 907, 911 (Miss.
2000) (finding no right to counsel for an indigent defendant because “she never asked for a
continuance or for additional time to seek substitute counsel”).
91
See, e.g., In re Angela R., 260 Cal. Rptr. 612, 624 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding no requirement to appoint counsel where a defendant fails to appear because the statute only required
such appointment “for an indigent parent who appears without counsel”).
92
In re Fillinger, No. 02A01-9409-JV-00223, 1996 WL 271748, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May
23, 1996).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
See The Star-Spangled Banner Lyrics, SMITHSONIAN, http://amhistory.si.edu/starspang
ledbanner/the-lyrics.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
96
See Robin Wright, Dictators Upbraid U.S. for Racial Unrest in Ferguson, WALL ST. J.:
WASH. WIRE (Aug. 19, 2014, 4:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/08/19/dicta
tors-upbraid-u-s-for-racial-unrest-in-ferguson.
97
AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 112A, at 6 (2006),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/l
s_sclaid_resolution_06a112a.authcheckdam.pdf.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 7.
89
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early 1900s.100 Additionally, much of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia provide indigent civil defendants with the right to counsel.101
Notably, most foreign jurisdictions that provide this right do so for all civil
cases.102 This presumably would include cases that threaten no fundamental interest or basic human need. Of the forty-five American states that currently
guarantee the right to counsel in TPR proceedings, none has protections as
broad as most of the aforementioned countries.103
II. THE HISTORY OF CIVIL GIDEON IN NEVADA
The history of Civil Gideon in Nevada is a confusing one. The Nevada Supreme Court has oscillated from finding no right to counsel in TPR cases, to
holding that the right exists, to again finding no such right in Nevada—all in
the absence of underlying substantive statutory changes by the Nevada Legislature.104 Ultimately, In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O. stands as binding law in
Nevada, stripping the right to counsel from TPR defendants.105
A. Pre-Lassiter
The Nevada Supreme Court recognized the serious implications of a termination of parental rights proceeding when it stated that the “termination of a
parent’s rights to her child is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty.”106 While Nevada acknowledges the fundamental interests at stake, it remains one of only five states that do not guarantee indigent defendants a categorical right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings.107 In
terms of due process rights, the Nevada Constitution mirrors the U.S. Constitution. Both declare that no individual may “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”108
Nevada’s legislature first addressed the issue in 1953, when it passed the
awkwardly titled “AN ACT relating to the termination of parental rights over
minors; providing a procedure therefor; defining the jurisdiction of courts in
relation thereto, and other matters relating thereto.”109 The statute stated that
“[i]n any [TPR] proceeding the judge may appoint an attorney to act on behalf

100

Id.
Id.
102
See id.
103
See id.
104
See infra Part II.A–C.
105
See In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223, 225–26 (Nev. 2005).
106
Drury v. Lang, 776 P.2d 843, 845 (Nev. 1989).
107
See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the
forty-fifth state to provide this right).
108
U.S. CONST. amend. V; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8.
109
1953 Nev. Stat. 184.
101
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of such minor person, or on behalf of the petitioner.”110 It was silent concerning
counsel for the defendant.111
The Nevada Supreme Court first considered the TPR defendant’s right to
counsel in the 1969 Casper v. Huber decision.112 There, a Nevada trial court
determined that Gerald Casper was an unfit father to his ten-year-old daughter
Deborah and entered an order terminating his parental rights.113 Casper appealed and requested an appointed attorney to represent him on the appeal.114
The Court noted the relevant statute only permitted the appointment of counsel
to represent the party petitioning for the termination of parental rights or for the
affected minor.115 Therefore, defendants in TPR proceedings had no statutory
right to counsel.116
The Court in Casper declined to consider the father’s due process claim
under either Article 1, section 8 of the Nevada Constitution or the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because “the appeal [was] clearly frivolous and appointed counsel would not [have been] of any use.”117 The Court
denied his request for counsel, found that the termination was in the best interests of the child, and dismissed the appeal as frivolous.118 Casper petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.119 The Court denied his petition.120
B. Between Lassiter and In re N.D.O
Only thirteen days after the Lassiter decision, Nevada amended the 1953
statute.121 It added the requirement that “[i]f the parent or parents of the child
desire to be represented by counsel, but are indigent, the court may appoint an
attorney for them.”122 This language has since remained unchanged and is currently codified as NRS 128.100(2).123
In 1996, the Nevada Supreme Court decided In re Parental Rights as to
Weinper, noting that other states have determined “as a matter of due process,
parents are entitled to: (1) a clear and definite statement of the allegations of the
petition; (2) notice of the hearing and the opportunity to be heard or defend;
110

Id. at 187.
See id.
112
Casper v. Huber, 456 P.2d 436, 436–37 (Nev. 1969).
113
Id.
114
Id. at 437.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 437–38.
119
See Casper v. Huber, 397 U.S. 1012 (1970).
120
Id.
121
See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (decided on June 1, 1981); 1981
Nev. Stat. 1750 (approved on June 14, 1981).
122
1981 Nev. Stat. at 1755 (emphasis added).
123
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.100(2) (2013).
111
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and (3) the right to counsel.”124 The Court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating parental rights because the defendant had received all of the above
considerations.125 However, the Court did not state whether the right to counsel
was a requirement in Nevada.126
One year later, in In re Parental Rights as to Bow, the Nevada Supreme
Court again considered the right to counsel in TPR cases.127 There, the defendant appealed the termination of her parental rights on the basis that, although
she was provided counsel at the final termination hearing, she was denied
counsel at other critical stages of the proceedings.128 The Court discussed the
Weinper Court’s observation that other states guaranteed the right to counsel in
TPR proceedings.129 Curiously, though, the Bow Court implied that the right to
counsel was a holding of the Weinper Court.130 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the trial court’s termination of parental rights because the defendant was
provided counsel at the final hearing.131
In In re Parental Rights as to Daniels, the Court reaffirmed the absolute
right to counsel in TPR proceedings.132 The issue before the Court concerned
the right to counsel at an earlier stage of the proceedings, when the children
were only temporarily removed from the father’s custody.133 The Court determined that the temporary removal of children does not require the same level of
procedural safeguards as permanent removal, because the interests at stake are
not as vital.134 Thus, the Court affirmed the decision to terminate Daniels’s parental rights.135
In his dissent, however, Chief Justice Springer noted that once a child is
temporarily removed from his parents, the probability that the removal will become permanent is greatly increased.136 He noted that even the trial judge was
troubled by the categorical lack of a due process right to counsel in such cases.137 Justice Springer concluded that “because of the ‘inherent imbalance of
124

In re Parental Rights as to Weinper, 918 P.2d 325, 328 (Nev. 1996) (emphasis added),
overruled by In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 8 P.3d 126 (2000) (overruled on
an unrelated issue).
125
Id. at 328, 330.
126
See id. at 328.
127
In re Parental Rights as to Bow, 930 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Nev. 1997), overruled by In re
Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 8 P.3d 126 (Nev. 2000) (overruled on an unrelated
issue), and abrogated by In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223 (Nev. 2005).
128
Id. at 1129, 1134.
129
Id. at 1134.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
In re Parental Rights as to Daniels, 953 P.2d 1, 5 (Nev. 1998), overruled by In re N.J., 8
P.3d 126 (overruled on an unrelated issue), and abrogated by In re N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223.
133
Id.
134
See id. at 7.
135
Id. at 10.
136
Id. at 12 (Springer, C.J., dissenting).
137
Id.
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experience and expertise between the parent and the state,’ [he] would adopt a
per se rule that would provide counsel in all cases in which the state seeks removal of a child from its home.”138
C. Post In re N.D.O.
In 2005, the legal landscape regarding the right to counsel in TPR proceedings shifted dramatically. In In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., the Court abrogated Weinper, Bow, and Daniels when it held “that no absolute right to counsel in termination proceedings exists in Nevada.”139 It went on to declare, “[o]ur
statute contemplates a case-by-case determination of whether due process demands the appointment of counsel.”140 In a major setback to Nevada’s Civil
Gideon movement, the Court retreated from the progress it had made.
The case involved a proceeding to terminate Letesheia O.’s parental rights
to her three children, referred to only as N.D.O., T.L.O. and T.O.141 The case
was originally heard in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division of Clark County, Nevada.142 The district court assigned counsel to
Letesheia O., as state precedent required.143 Nevertheless, the court found in
favor of the state and terminated her parental rights.144
The court based its decision on Letesheia’s poor record as a parent.145 She
had been in and out of jail several times for theft convictions.146 The state asserted that much of this theft was to support her cocaine habit.147 Additionally,
the state had previously removed her children on multiple occasions stemming
from allegations of abuse and neglect.148 Twice, the court mandated a case plan
in which Letesheia would take classes on substance abuse, domestic violence,
and parenting and would undergo counseling.149 Both times Letesheia only
minimally complied with the mandates.150 During this time, the children lived
primarily with their maternal grandmother.151 In fact, at the time of the TPR
proceedings, Letesheia had been in jail for nearly twelve out of the previous
eighteen months.152
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 13 (quoting Brown v. Guy, 476 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. Nev. 1979)).
In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223, 225 (Nev. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 223.
See id. at 226.
Id. at 224, 228.
See id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Letesheia appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court on the basis that she had
received ineffective assistance of counsel.153 She claimed that her attorney had
repeatedly failed to object to the admittance of hearsay evidence, that he failed
to object to evidence regarding her prior felony convictions, and that these errors prejudiced her proceeding.154
The Court first considered whether Nevada requires the provision of counsel in TPR proceedings.155 It noted, “[r]ecent precedent may have generated
confusion as to whether, and when, a right to counsel exists.”156 According to
the Court, the Weinper Court merely observed that other states provided the
right to counsel in these proceedings, which subsequent opinions mischaracterized as a mandate for the provision of counsel in Nevada TPR proceedings.157
Returning to the precise language of the Nevada statute, the Court held that “no
absolute right to counsel in termination proceedings exists in Nevada” and that
the statute required only a case-by-case approach.158
The Court relied solely on the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and on the relevant federal jurisprudence regarding the Due Process
Clause.159 The Court did not consider whether the Nevada Constitution’s Due
Process Clause provided more protection for these indigent defendants.160
Still, the Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge test and determined that
due process did not require the appointment of counsel for Letesheia.161 The
Court quickly dispensed with the first and third prongs of the test, finding that
the parent’s interests in avoiding the “civil death penalty” and the state’s interests in protecting children from neglect and abuse are both “invariably . . .
strong in termination proceedings.”162
The Court then considered the second prong of the Eldridge test—the risk
of erroneous deprivation of the interest and the value of additional safeguards.163 The record reflected that the trial court admitted a number of hearsay
statements without objection from Letesheia’s attorney.164 Both the case manager and the investigator for the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS)
testified that the children told them they were happy with their grandmother
and that the grandmother wanted to keep them.165 Neither the grandmother nor

153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 225–26.
Id. at 225.
Id.; see supra Part II.B.
In re N.D.O., 115 P.3d at 225.
Id. at 226.
See id. at 225–26.
Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the children testified in court.166 The Court determined that this was harmless
error, because those same statements were included in the DCFS reports, which
were already admitted in evidence.167 Thus, with or without effective counsel,
the statements would have been admitted.168
It is important to note that this ruling appears to misapply Nevada’s hearsay rules.169 Thus, a competent attorney may have successfully excluded these
statements. That the Nevada courts are confused on the application of the hearsay rules further supports the need for an attorney in all termination of parental
rights proceedings.
Finally, the Court found that it was in the best interest of the children to
terminate Letesheia’s parental rights.170 It partially based its finding on the fact
that Letesheia failed to present evidence rebutting the presumption that termination was in the children’s best interest.171 While the record is silent concerning Letesheia’s educational background,172 it seems probable that she was unaware of this statutory presumption, of her requirement to rebut that
presumption, or of how one could rebut the presumption. An effective attorney
could have assisted her in this regard.
Ultimately, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It found that
because she was not entitled to counsel, Letesheia had no viable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.173 Unfortunately, the holding of In re Parental
Rights as to N.D.O. remains valid law in the state of Nevada. Indigent defendants are no longer entitled to an attorney when the state seeks to terminate their
parental rights.174

166

Id.
Id.
168
Id. at 226–27.
169
The DCFS reports, themselves, were likely admissible under the Nevada hearsay exception for public records and reports. NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.155 (2013) (“Records, reports,
statements or data compilations, in any form, of public officials or agencies are not inadmissible under the hearsay rule if they set forth: 1) The activities of the official or agency; 2)
Matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law; or 3) In civil cases and against the State
in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or the method or circumstances of the investigation indicate lack of trustworthiness.”). The notes in the report regarding the statements of the children and the grandmother, on the other hand, were likely inadmissible hearsay. NRS 51.067 plainly states that “[h]earsay included within hearsay is not excluded under
the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms to an exception to the
hearsay rule provided in this chapter.” Id. § 51.067 (2013). In other words, each level of
hearsay must fall within an exception to be admissible.
170
In re N.D.O., 115 P.3d at 227.
171
Id. at 227 n.19.
172
See id. at 224–28.
173
Id. at 227.
174
Id. at 225.
167
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH
The case-by-case approach, as used by only five states,175 is wrought with
problems.176 Scholars have consistently noted the method’s flaws,177 yet it persists in Nevada. Unfortunately, data suggests that defendants are suffering as a
result, especially in Nevada’s appellate process.178
A. Case-by-Case Approaches, Generally
1. Justice Blackmun’s Dissent in Lassiter
The Lassiter decision was not unanimous.179 It was a 5-4 decision, with
Justices Blackmun, Brennen, Marshall, and Stevens all dissenting.180 Justice
Blackmun’s dissent in Lassiter is compelling. In it, he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel for defendants in every
TPR proceeding.181 Justice Blackmun noted a strange irony in the majority’s
reasoning:
The Court’s analysis is markedly similar to mine; it, too, analyzes the three
factors listed in Mathews v. Eldridge, and it, too, finds the private interest
weighty, the procedure devised by the State fraught with risks of error, and the
countervailing governmental interest insubstantial. Yet, rather than follow this
balancing process to its logical conclusion, the Court abruptly pulls back and
announces that a defendant parent must await a case-by-case determination of
his or her need for counsel. Because the three factors “will not always be so distributed,” reasons the Court, the Constitution should not be read to “requir[e] the
appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding.”182

Justice Blackmun went on to state that the Eldridge test called for a caseby-case consideration of various decision-making contexts, not of various defendants within those contexts.183 He noted that the Court had previously distinguished welfare recipients as a class of litigants184 and had ruled on Social
Security pre-termination procedures in general.185 The Lassiter decision appears to stand in stark opposition to the rationale of the Eldridge court, which
stated, “To be sure, credibility and veracity may be a factor in the ultimate dis175

See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the
forty-fifth state to provide this right).
176
See infra Part III.A–B.
177
See infra Part III.A.2–6.
178
See infra Part III.B.
179
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34–35 (1981).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
182
Id. at 48–49.
183
Id. at 49.
184
Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970)).
185
Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–45 (1976)).
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ability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules are shaped
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”186
Additionally, Justice Blackmun noted the inherent problems in the post hoc
analysis the majority adopted.187 A case-by-case approach would require a state
appellate court to review the record in search of evidence that the trial court erroneously deprived the defendant of his parental rights.188 While “obvious
blunders” would be apparent to the reviewing court, the subtle benefits that legal representation could have provided would require “imagination, investigation, and legal research focused on the particular case.”189 Even with such a
thorough review, it could still be impossible to discern the effect trained representation would have had on the outcome.190
Finally, Justice Blackmun reasoned that a case-by-case approach would
have other ancillary drawbacks.191 For instance, the requirement of an ad hoc
review would increase the strain on the nation’s appellate courts.192 It would
also carry with it additional monetary costs.193
Justice Stevens authored a separate dissenting opinion, going one step further than Justice Blackmun:
In my opinion the reasons supporting the conclusion that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles the defendant in a criminal case to
representation by counsel apply with equal force to a case of this kind. The issue
is one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing the pecuniary costs against the
societal benefits. Accordingly, even if the costs to the State were not relatively
insignificant but rather were just as great as the costs of providing prosecutors,
judges, and defense counsel to ensure the fairness of criminal proceedings, I
would reach the same result in this category of cases. For the value of protecting
our liberty from deprivation by the State without due process of law is priceless.194

Justice Stevens hinged his dissent on fundamental fairness.195 Considering
the issue from this perspective—rather than balancing the costs—suggests a
valuable realization: a parent’s right to her child is fundamental and demands a
great level of legal protection.

186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Id. at 50 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344).
Id. at 50–51.
See id.
Id. at 51.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id.
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2. Procedural Problems with the Case-by-Case Approach
The case-by-case approach to the appointment of counsel in termination of
parental rights proceedings presents a number of problems not inherent to a
categorical approach. First, the case-by-case approach requires trial judges to
evaluate, in advance, the difference that an attorney might make in the case.196
This necessarily requires the judge to predict the testimonial, physical, and
documentary evidence197 and to determine the potential legal complexities and
other demands the case may lay on the indigent defendant. Because it is impossible for judges to accurately make these predictions, let alone determine the
potential disputed issues at trial, the defendant suffers the serious risk of being
denied counsel to which he otherwise may have been entitled.198
Second, the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing approach is more suited to application in an appellate proceeding—not at trial. This approach routinely requires trial judges to evaluate complex and nebulous concepts to determine
whether due process considerations require the appointment of counsel.199
Where one judge may interpret “the risk of erroneous deprivation” liberally,
another may set the bar higher. Thus, the same set of facts may lead one judge
to appoint counsel and another one to deny counsel. Surely, the use of the
state’s tremendous power to separate a child permanently from its parents demands a less ambiguous standard than the case-by-case approach provides.
Finally, appellate review is insufficient, in many cases, to remedy the harm
caused by the lack of counsel. As Justice Blackman noted in his dissent in Lassiter:
Determining the difference legal representation would have made becomes possible only through imagination, investigation, and legal research focused on the
particular case. Even if the reviewing court can embark on such an enterprise in
each case, it might be hard pressed to discern the significance of failures to challenge the State’s evidence or to develop a satisfactory defense. Such failures,
however, often cut to the essence of the fairness of the trial, and a court’s inability to compensate for them effectively eviscerates the presumption of innocence.
Because a parent acting pro se is even more likely to be unaware of controlling
legal standards and practices, and unskilled in garnering relevant facts, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that the typical case has been adequately
presented.200

Furthermore, many indigent defendants never seek appellate review because they may be unaware of the right to appeal or may believe they have no
chance of a reversal without the help of counsel.201 Some may even be unaware

196
197
198
199
200
201

Pollock & Greco, supra note 25, at 42.
Id.
Id. at 42–43.
See id. at 43.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Pollock & Greco, supra note 25, at 43.
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of the option to appeal. In this regard, the denial of counsel also serves to disempower defendants in the appellate process.
3. Special Considerations of Abuse and Neglect Proceedings
While abuse and neglect proceedings are not per se termination of parental
rights proceedings, they share enough similarities to justify their inclusion in
this discussion. For example, when a Nevada court finds that a parent has
abused or neglected his child, it has the authority to place the children permanently with a guardian.202 Though this proceeding does not terminate the parental rights, the permanent removal of the child from the parent creates a similar
result.
Moreover, the need for an attorney in abuse and neglect proceedings may
be even more compelling than in a TPR case. First, evidence obtained in an
abuse and neglect civil proceeding may later be used against the defendant to
support criminal charges for the same disputed issues.203 Second, the evidence
may also be used later to support a petition to permanently terminate the defendant’s parental rights.204
John Pollock, coordinator for the National Coalition for a Civil Right to
Counsel, addressed the disturbing issues that arise out of the potential for future
proceedings based upon abuse and neglect proceedings.205 He noted that parents have the potential to incriminate themselves in these proceedings.206 Evidence obtained in an abuse and neglect proceeding will frequently be used to
support future TPR proceedings.207 Appointing an attorney at the later TPR
stage will be of limited use, as much of the fact finding will have been accomplished and admitted into the record in the abuse and neglect proceeding.208 As
the cliché states, it is not possible to “un-ring the bell.”
4. Private Termination Proceedings
One could argue that when private parties, rather than the state, initiate
termination of parental rights proceedings, such proceedings do not justify the
automatic appointment of counsel for the defendant. The presumed logic behind such a claim is that, because the state is not taking action, the quasicriminal aspect of the proceeding is absent. This notion, however, ignores one
key fact: a successful private TPR petition will still result in the defendant los-

202

See NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.020 (2013) (defining abuse and neglect); id. § 432B.466
(setting forth the conditions for appointing a guardian).
203
Pollock, supra note 19, at 780.
204
Id.
205
See id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
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ing her parental rights.209 Thus, regardless of the party seeking termination, the
parent’s fundamental rights remain at risk.
Furthermore, state action is abundant in a TPR proceeding initiated by a
private party. Often, there is little to no difference in the proceeding when a
private party initiates it. For example, Nevada law allows “[t]he agency which
provides child welfare services, the probation officer, or any other person, including the mother of an unborn child, . . . [to] file with the clerk of the court a
petition” for termination of parental rights.210 The statutes do not substantially
distinguish privately initiated proceedings from publicly initiated proceedings.211 In terms of process and potential outcomes, it is irrelevant who initiates
the petition.212
Additionally, some states have attempted to argue that fiscal considerations
justify denying a right to counsel in private termination proceedings.213 Courts
that have addressed this issue have routinely held that the state’s interest in saving money is not as compelling as the parents’ interest in their children.214 Regardless of the reason that defendants are not afforded a categorical right to
counsel, the case-by-case Eldridge approach becomes the unfortunate alternative.
5. Due Process Inadequacies
Even if one accepts the shaky premise that proper application of the
Mathews v. Eldridge factors results in the appointment of counsel for all appropriate indigent defendants, the due process approach is wrought with pitfalls.
Professor Rosalie Young notes six barriers to due process in termination of parental rights proceedings.215 First, the definitions of “indigence” and “financial
hardship” vary from state to state and from courthouse to courthouse.216 This
may result in defendants being denied counsel despite the inability to retain an
attorney on their own.

209

See id. at 784.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.040 (2013).
211
See id. §§ 128.005–.190 (listing Nevada’s statutes pertaining to termination of parental
rights).
212
See id. § 128.120 (“Any order made and entered by the court under the provisions of
NRS 128.110 is conclusive and binding upon the person declared to be free from the custody
and control of his or her parent or parents, and upon all other persons who have been served
with notice by publication or otherwise, as provided by this chapter.”).
213
See In re Adoption of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 753 (Ill. 2002) (noting that the state withdrew its TPR petition so that prospective adoptive parents could begin adoption proceedings,
where the defendant had no right to counsel and the state would not have the associated expense).
214
E.g., id.; In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 1993).
215
Young, supra note 72, at 263–66.
216
Id. at 263.
210
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Second, some states require that parents request an attorney; however, parents are not automatically informed of the right.217 Frequently, these defendants
are unaware that they may request counsel, or even that they need counsel.218
This problem compounds after a defendant loses his parental rights at trial. The
defendant who was ignorant of his right to counsel at the original proceeding is
likely to be equally uninformed of his right to appeal.219
Third, trial courts vary in their application of the “clear and convincing evidence” standard.220 An attorney is crucial to ensure that the courts do not slip
below the standard’s requirements and instead evaluate the case under a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.
Fourth, where counsel is appointed but is inadequate, a reversal is rare.221
Because the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not confer a right to
counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings, there can be no corresponding appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.222 Even in states
that allow such appeals, defendants have a monumental hurdle to overcome. To
succeed, the defendant must show that the attorney was incompetent, that his
incompetence led to an unfair trial, and that the result was not harmless error.223
This burden may become insurmountable when the defendant has no attorney
to argue the appeal.
Fifth, appointed attorneys are often inadequately compensated.224 Because
appointment of counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings is not a
constitutional mandate, states may not feel compelled to allocate significant
funding to the issue. Consequently, many attorneys may choose not to participate in TPR appointments.225 Moreover, those that do participate may not apply
their usual degree of zealous representation to the case.226
Finally, though preliminary proceedings (such as abuse and neglect proceedings)227 may place crucial facts on the record and may implicate substantial
rights, counsel may not be appointed until the initiation of a TPR petition.228 By
that time, however, it may be too late. Hence, the due process approach fails to
consider the potential implications of lesser proceedings. The categorical provision of counsel in TPR and all associated proceedings would eliminate this
problem.
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Id. at 264.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 265.
See, e.g., In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223, 227 (Nev. 2005).
Young, supra note 72, at 265.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.A.3.
Young, supra note 72 at 265–66.

16 NEV. L.J. 313, FOLEY - FINAL.DOCX

336

1/15/16 9:28 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:313

Furthermore, indigent defendants may have a greater need for an attorney
than non-indigent defendants. Indigent defendants tend to be less educated than
their non-indigent counterparts.229 In fact, many of the qualities that brought
them under TPR review militate in favor of counsel. Some may have poor mental functioning or low IQ, be involved in crime, or suffer from drug addiction.230 Nevertheless, termination hearings may require defendants to participate in discovery, cross-examine witnesses, make objections, preserve issues
for appeal, and determine and prove the relevant facts.231 These tasks are difficult for even a well-educated layperson. It is a daunting endeavor for the uneducated defendant, especially one with the aforementioned problems.
6. The Consequences of Pro Se Representation
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s finding that the presence of an attorney would not have affected Ms. Lassiter’s case,232 research suggests that adequate representation has a significant effect on trial outcomes.233 Because pro se
defendants often lack knowledge of legal processes, they frequently lose due to
a procedural error or default.234 Additionally, pro se defendants are unskilled in
the practice of discovery and trial motions, which, when accomplished by
skilled attorneys, often makes the difference between winning and losing a
case.235
In fact, studies show a significant difference in the success rates of pro se
defendants and represented defendants. For example, at contested proceedings
in general, a party’s odds of success are cut in half when she has no attorney.236
Even in relatively simple protective order proceedings, the numbers are strik-

229

See Kyung M. Lee, Comment, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders,
Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 398 (2004) (noting a
link between poverty and a lack of education of inmate populations).
230
See Richard C. Boldt, Evaluating Histories of Substance Abuse in Cases Involving the
Termination of Parental Rights, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 135, 135 (1999) (discussing
“the intersecting problems of parental substance abuse and child neglect and abuse” in TPR
cases); Alexis C. Collentine, Note, Respecting Intellectually Disabled Parents: A Call for
Change in State Termination of Parental Rights Statutes, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 535, 542
(2005) (explaining that “parents with mental disabilities are more likely than the rest of the
parental population to have their children removed and their parental rights terminated”
(footnote omitted)).
231
Young, supra note 72, at 257–58.
232
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32–33 (1981).
233
See Alba, supra note 21, at 1095–98.
234
Id. at 1096–97.
235
Id. at 1097.
236
Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue Right to
Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 72 (2007) (citing Robert H. Mnookin et al.,
Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial Arrangements Are Parents Negotiating?, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 37, 64 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herman Hill Kay
eds., 1990)).
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ing: the petitioning party with an attorney is successful 83 percent of the
time.237 The pro se party wins only 32 percent of the same petitions.
Attorneys and judges frequently remark as to the disparity between represented and pro se defendants:
Lawyers acknowledge this problem and have released numerous resolutions, studies, and scholarly articles arguing the issue. Though their statements
could arguably be colored by professional self interest, judges who preside over
civil proceedings also acknowledge this reality. A judge who served on the California Court of Appeals observed that the countless cases he reviewed where a
pro se party argued against a lawyer left him with serious doubts as to whether
pro se litigants obtain fair hearings. This is true even despite the fact that courts
hold pro se filings to less stringent standards than attorney filings. Many of these
pro se litigants need the assistance of an attorney in order to obtain the fair hearing that is their constitutional right, but our current system leaves them to fend
for themselves.238

As the Gideon Court astutely observed, “That government hires lawyers to
prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries.”239
B. Analysis of the Current Nevada Statute and Its Applications
Section 128.100, the Nevada statute regarding the appointment of counsel
for TPR proceedings, reads as follows:
1. In any proceeding for terminating parental rights, or any rehearing or appeal thereon, or any proceeding for restoring parental rights, the court may appoint an attorney to represent the child as his or her counsel and, if the child
does not have a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to NRS 432B.500, as his
or her guardian ad litem. The child may be represented by an attorney at all
stages of any proceedings for terminating parental rights. If the child is represented by an attorney, the attorney has the same authority and rights as an attorney representing a party to the proceedings.
2. If the parent or parents of the child desire to be represented by counsel,
but are indigent, the court may appoint an attorney for them.
3. Each attorney appointed under the provisions of this section is entitled to
the same compensation and expenses from the county as provided in NRS 7.125
and 7.135 for attorneys appointed to represent persons charged with crimes.240

1. Nevada Trial Statistics
NRS section 128.100 grants Nevada courts discretionary authority to appoint counsel. It is difficult to determine accurately how courts across the state
237

Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges
to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 511–12 (2003).
238
Alba, supra note 21, at 1097–98 (footnotes omitted).
239
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
240
NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.100 (2013) (emphasis added).
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are exercising this discretion. In Clark County, however, the number of TPR
cases is on the rise.241 The Clark County Family Court averages about 300 open
cases at any given time.242 As of June 25, 2015, private attorneys (who are contracted for conflict cases from the Special Public Defender’s Office) had 313
open TPR cases.243 Nearly all of these TPR defendants are indigent.244
Family Court Judge Frank Sullivan notes that the recent increase in TPR
cases corresponds to an increase in the percentage of contested cases, a phenomenon he believes stems from a recent policy change.245 In 2010, Judge Sullivan instituted a policy requiring the Family Court to appoint counsel for TPR
defendants.246 While this development is very encouraging, it says nothing
about the status of TPR defendants outside of Clark County, nor does it guarantee the policy will remain after Judge Sullivan leaves the bench.
In Clark County, judges ask defendants about their financial status during
their initial hearing.247 It appears that nearly every request for counsel is granted in TPR proceedings;248 however, the number is less for abuse and neglect
proceedings.249 If the judge appoints counsel, the Special Public Defender’s office assigns an attorney to the case. When there is a conflict of interest in the
Special Public Defender’s office, a private, contracted attorney is appointed.250
2. Nevada Appellate Statistics
Nevada’s appellate numbers tell a more discouraging tale. From 2012 to
2014, sixty-four TPR defendants filed appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court
after losing their parental rights at trial.251 Of the twenty-three filed in 2012, fifteen appellants had the assistance of counsel and eight were pro se.252 The mat241

Yesenia Amaro, Judges Face Rising Tide of Parental Rights Termination Cases, L.V.
REV.-J. (May 10, 2015, 1:38 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/judgesface-rising-tide-parental-rights-termination-cases.
242
Id.
243
Telephone Interview with Drew Christensen, Dir., Clark Cty. Office of Appointed Counsel (June 25, 2015) [hereinafter Christensen Interview].
244
Memorandum from Courtney Ketter, Law Clerk to the Honorable Frank P. Sullivan, to
author (Feb. 26, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ketter Memorandum] (“I can only
recall one case in the past year where a parent was able to afford private counsel on his
own.”).
245
Amaro, supra note 241.
246
Id.
247
Ketter Memorandum, supra note 244.
248
Id. (stating that “99 [percent] of the request[s] are granted”); see also Christensen Interview, supra note 243 (stating that nearly 100 percent of TPR defendants receive appointed
counsel at the trial level).
249
Christensen Interview, supra note 243. The lack of counsel in abuse and neglect proceedings can prejudice the defendants in later TPR proceedings. See supra Part III.A.3.
250
Christensen Interview, supra note 243.
251
E-mail from Susan Wilson, Supervisory Staff Attorney, Nev. Supreme Court, to Justice
Kristina Pickering, Nev. Supreme Court (Mar. 26, 2015) (on file with author).
252
Id.
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ters of the fifteen represented appellants proceeded without complications.253
However, of the eight pro se appellants, only five successfully navigated the
process.254 The other three had their appeals dismissed for various procedural
problems.255 The numbers from 2013 are even more disturbing. Ten of the
twenty-two appeals included pro se appellants.256 Of those ten, the Court dismissed eight appeals on procedural grounds without hearing the appeal’s merit.257 None of the represented parents failed on procedural grounds.258 Again, in
2014, the Court dismissed five of nine pro se TPR appeals on procedural
grounds.259 As before, all of the represented appellants successfully navigated
the appellate process.260
The contrast between represented parents and unrepresented parents is
striking. From 2012 to 2014, no represented parent’s appeal was dismissed prior to reaching a decision on the merits.261 Over the same period, the Court dismissed 59 percent of pro se filings for jurisdictional problems or for failure to
prosecute.262 This disparity suggests that the presence of counsel has a measurable effect on the outcome of TPR appeals and the absence of counsel is often
dispositive.
The availability of an attorney for appeal often depends on what form of attorney represents the parents at trial: an attorney with the Special Public Defender’s office or a private attorney appointed due to a conflict of interest with
the SPD office. Private attorneys frequently do not handle appeals and therefore
withdraw after the TPR trial.263 While attorneys for the Special Public Defender’s office will handle the appeal for parents that the attorneys represented at
trial, the office does not take on appeals for parents who had a private attorney
at trial.264 In 2013 alone, 740 defendants received private representation in their
TPR proceeding.265 Therefore, defendants often lack an attorney on appeal.

253

See id.
Id.
255
Id. (explaining that the appeals were dismissed for jurisdictional problems or for failure
to prosecute).
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
See id.
259
Id.
260
See id.
261
See id.
262
Id. (sixteen of twenty-seven over the three year period).
263
Ketter Memorandum, supra note 244.
264
See id.
265
Christensen Interview, supra note 243.
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IV. JUSTIFYING REFORM
Nevada must join the other forty-five states266 that provide a categorical
right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings. This can be accomplished in one of two ways. First, the Nevada Supreme Court should interpret the Nevada Constitution’s Due Process Clause more liberally than the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, and require the appointment of counsel for TPR defendants. This, presumably, would not require
the Court to overrule In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., as that decision was
based upon the Lassiter Court’s review of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process
Clause.267
Second, the Nevada legislature should amend NRS section 128.100(2) to
state, “If the parent or parents of the child desire to be represented by counsel,
but are indigent, the court shall appoint an attorney for them.” The discretionary word “may” should be replaced with the compulsory word “shall.” Either
one of these options would circumvent the numerous pitfalls of the case-bycase approach currently in use in Nevada268 and would much more ably protect
the rights of the state’s indigent defendants.269
Furthermore, Nevada courts must inform defendants of the newly created
right to counsel, of their right to appeal should they lose, and their right to an
attorney on that appeal. A TPR defendant should proceed pro se only with an
informed waiver of his right to counsel.
The Civil Gideon movement has widespread support in the legal community, as the American Bar Association demonstrated in 2006 when its House of
Delegates unanimously endorsed a resolution supporting Civil Gideon.
[T]he American Bar Association urges federal, state, and territorial governments
to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income
persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs
are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child
custody, as determined by each jurisdiction.270

A. Using a Mathews v. Eldridge Analysis to Support Reform
The Lassiter Court hinged its decision upon the fact that “an indigent’s
right to appointed counsel . . . has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.”271 That the Su266

See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the
forty-fifth state to provide this right).
267
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
268
See generally supra Part III.
269
Though the determination of indigence will remain subjective, removing the other variables created by the case-by-case approach will help to substantially reduce the unpredictability and subjectivity experienced by TPR defendants.
270
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 97, at 1.
271
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
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preme Court regards even minor deprivations of physical liberty to be more serious than the permanent loss of one’s child is troubling.
A proper Mathews v. Eldridge analysis demonstrates that TPR defendants
are entitled to the right to counsel. The first factor in the test is a consideration
of the private interests at stake in the proceeding.272 In Lassiter, the Supreme
Court noted that its “decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for
multiple citation that a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that
‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.’ ”273
The Nevada Supreme Court also acknowledged the compelling private interests when it stated, “termination of a parent’s rights to her child is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty.”274 This may, in fact, be an understatement, as many parents value their own life less than they value the life of
their child. Consider for example, a mother faced with the horrible choice between saving her unborn baby’s life and saving her own life. Some in this situation choose to save the baby275—and this is a child she has not even met. Thus,
there can be little doubt that the private interest at stake in a TPR proceeding is
at least as compelling as that in a minor criminal proceeding.
The second Eldridge factor regards the risk of an erroneous deprivation
and the value of additional procedural safeguards.276 The Supreme Court noted
that “numerous factors combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding”
in TPR proceedings.277 The Court observed that these proceedings employed
nebulous substantive standards that subjected the review to the judge’s own
subjective values.278 Indigent defendants, largely comprised of minorities and
uneducated persons, are “vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias.”279
In addition to the many other factors discussed above,280 these additional
risks demonstrate the vital need for an attorney.281 The presence of counsel can
mitigate these problems.282 A trained voice can help ensure that the judge’s biases do not affect his discretion.283 The benefit of representation in a TPR proceeding is likely significant. Defendants may need to write motions, ask for
272

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
274
Drury v. Lang, 776 P.2d 843, 845 (Nev. 1989).
275
See, e.g., Mom Chooses to Die During Childbirth to Save Son, ABC7.COM (Nov. 24,
2014), http://abc7.com/family/mom-chooses-to-die-during-childbirth-to-save-son/408747.
276
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321.
277
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982).
278
Id.
279
Id. at 763.
280
See supra Part III.A.2–6.
281
See Alba, supra note 21, at 1108.
282
Id.
283
Id.
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discovery, unearth relevant facts, and argue complex issues. Trained attorneys
are far more capable of accomplishing these vital steps.
Finally, the third Eldridge factor regards the government’s interest in the
proceeding, including the costs of providing additional safeguards.284 The government has two key interests in TPR proceedings.285 The first is its parens patriae interest in the welfare of the child.286 The second is its interest in reducing
the cost of the relevant proceedings.287 The parens patriae interest is similar to
the interests of the parents. If anything, this interest favors keeping a child with
her parents.288 Additionally, a court is better equipped to provide for the welfare
of the child when counsel is present to raise appropriate issues and bring relevant facts to the court’s attention.289
Regarding the government’s financial interests, Attorney Sarah Dina
Moore Alba argues that providing a categorical right to counsel can actually
save the government money.290 Alba cites several studies demonstrating that
civil cases with attorneys are more cost effective than those that proceed with
pro se parties.291 She also notes that the use of attorneys results in fewer children being separated from their parents, which saves the government the expense of providing foster homes.292 Even if the government were to incur more
costs from the appointment of counsel, this interest cannot outweigh the parent’s interest. As even the Lassiter majority conceded, “[T]hough the State’s
pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those here . . . .”293
When one considers these three factors together, the balance tips considerably towards the categorical provision of counsel in termination of parental
rights proceedings. The Lassiter majority may have erred in its consideration of
the first two factors. First, it appears to have undervalued the interest of the
parent in keeping their children. Second, it failed to recognize the benefit of
counsel in even simple proceedings. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances
in which the interest of the parent would be greater. An attorney is essential to
protect this interest. Thus, the Eldridge factors demand the appointment of
counsel in all TPR proceedings.

284

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 766–67.
289
Alba, supra note 21, at 1108.
290
Id. at 1110–11.
291
See id. at 1111 (first citing Carol J. Williams, California Gives the Poor a New Legal
Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at A8; and then citing (Penny) Wise Justice for California,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at A30).
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Id.
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Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
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CONCLUSION
Termination of parental rights proceedings are a “civil death penalty.”294
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia have all recognized the shortcomings of the case-by-case approach. Nevada is one of only five states that
directs the substantial mechanism of governmental power to remove a child
permanently from her parents while denying those subject to that deprivation
the right to an attorney. This must be corrected either by statutory reform or by
judicial recognition of more substantial Nevada due process rights. Society
should be confident that the system employs all possible measures to ensure the
process is fair. It is past time for Civil Gideon to come to Nevada. Parents may
not always deserve their children, but they always deserve adequate representation to ensure a fair adjudication of the matter. The recognition of individual
due process rights demands nothing less.

294

Drury v. Lang, 776 P.2d 843, 845 (Nev. 1989).
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